

Message Text

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PAGE 01 PEKING 00932 090938Z
ACTION SS-25

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P 090850Z MAYE77
FM USLO PEKING
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INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PEKING 0932

EXDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR CH
SUBJ: PRC VICE FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS ON
US FOREIGN POLICY

REF: A) PEKING 820, B) PEKING 886

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: JAPANESE EMBASSY
HAS BRIEFED US ON SOME PARTS OF A CONVERSATION IN
PEKING APRIL 30 BETWEEN PRC VICE FOREIGN MINISTER
YU CHAN AND FORMER JAPANESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HOGEN.

2. YU EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH US POLICY
TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND AT ONE POINT REMARKED:
"WATCHING WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS DOING VIS-A-VIS
THE SOVIET UNION, WE FEEL THEREIS SOME PROBLEM."
YU WAS NOT ASKED AND DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT
US CHINA POLICY, A TOPIC ON WHICH HE HAD
HELD FORTH ON APRIL 25 TO WASHINGTON POST CORRES-
PONDENT JAY MATHEWS (REF A AND STATE 97149).
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3. YU, WHOSE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE FOREIGN
MEDIA RELATIONS, IS NOTED FOR BLUNT (AND USUALLY
UNATTRIBUTED) CRITICISM OF THE US AS WELL AS
THE USSR. HE IS IN FACT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S
HATCHET MAN. THE REGIME HAS USED HIM SEVERAL

TIMES (E.G. LE MONDE, NOVEMBER 6, 1976; AND THE MATHEWS INTERVIEW REFERRED TO ABOVE) TO PUT ON THE PUBLIC RECORD VIEWS ABOUT THE US THAT OTHER PRC OFFICIALS USUALLY FOREGO EXPRESSING TO FOREIGN VISITORS, OR ELSE STATE IN MORE GENERAL TERMS. YU PRESUMABLY EXPECTED THAT HIS REMARKS TO HOGEN WOULD REACH THE US GOVERNMENT. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

4. THE COMMENTS BY YU CHAN REPORTED BELOW ARE THOSE IN WHICH HE WENT BEYOND THE STANDARD PRC PUBLIC COMMENTARY ON US POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS, IT WILL BE NOTED, VERY LITTLE THAT

IS NEW IN THESE REMARKS EXCEPT FOR DIRECT OR INDIRECT (THE YUGOSLAVIA MATTER) REFERENCES TO PRES. CARTER.

5. "BECAUSE THE US PURSUES DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION, POLITICIANS IN ALLIED COUNTRIES ARE PUT IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. THOSE WHO TAKE A STRONG POSITION AGAINST THE SOVIETS ARE DRIVEN FROM POWER. IT'S VERY DISADVANTAGEOUS. THOSE WHO HAVE CLEAR MINDS CANNOT REMAIN IN POWER. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DIPLOMATS (SIC) TO HELP THEM REGAIN POWER. THOSE POLITICIANS WHO ADVOCATE WEAK POSITIONS ARE IN POWER."

6. "SOME AMERICANS THINK THAT BY PURSUING DETENTE WITH RUSSIA, THE RUSSIANS MAY ATTACK CHINA. BUT THIS IDEA IS COMPLETELY WRONG, BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT ATTACK CHINA BEFORE OBTAINING EUROPE
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AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY KNOW CHINA IS NOT AN EASY OPPONENT. THE WAR WILL BE PROTRACTED. THE US MAY ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION FROM BEHIND. BEFORE THE SOVIET ARMY OCCUPIES PEKING, AMERICAN TROOPS WILL OCCUPY MOSCOW. EVEN THE SOVIETS' ALLIES DO NOT AGREE WITH THIS IDEA OF THE SOVIETS ATTACKING CHINA. IN PARTICULAR EAST GERMANY IS AFRAID."

7. "SOVIET CONTROL OVER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IS VERY WEAK. THIS IS THE SOVIETS' WEAK POINT. BUT THE US, INSTEAD OF USING THIS WEAKNESS, IS ASSISTING THE SOVIETS TO TIGHTEN THEIR CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE. THE US (SIC) MADE A STATEMENT THAT IF THE SOVIETS ATTACK YUGOSLAVIA THE US CANNOT HELP. THIS AMOUNTS TO ENCOURAGING THE SOVIETS TO INVADE YUGOSLAVIA. IF YUGOSLAVIA FALLS INTO SOVIET HANDS, THE SOVIET UNION'S STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WILL BE GREATLY ENHANCED.

THE U.S. SHOULD HAVE MADE A STATEMENT THAT IF THE SOVIETS ATTACK YUGOSLAVIA THE U.S. WILL NOT SIT IDLY BY. OR AT LEAST IT SHOULD HAVE KEPT SILENT. THEN THE SOVIETS WOULD BE A LITTLE BIT WORRIED. AN OPEN STATEMENT LIKE THAT IS AN INVITATION TO INVADE YUGOSLAVIA."

8. DRAWING A PARALLEL CASE IN ZAIRE, AND AFTER CHARGING THAT THE U.S. DID NOT HAVE THE COURAGE TO HELP ZAIRE, YU CHAN SAID: "IT WAS ALL RIGHT FOR THE U.S. NOT TO HELP ZAIRE. BUT THE U.S. WENT ON TO MAKE A STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT. THIS AMOUNTS TO PUTTING UP A SMOKE SCREEN FOR THE SOVIETS."

9. "WHEN I SAW AN AMERICAN (JAY MATTHEWS?) I SAID THESE THINGS AND CRITICIZED THE U.S. HE DID NOT AGREE, AND HE ASKED ME WHAT CHINA HAD DONE. I CONFIDENTIAL

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ANSWERED THAT CHINA DOES NOT DO MANY THINGS. BUT AT LEAST IT DOES THIS: WHEN YOU SEE A THIEF AT WORK, YOU SHOUT THIEF. BY DOING THIS THE ACTIONS OF THE THIEF CALLED THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT SMOOTHLY. BUT THE U.S. DOESN'T UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF SHOUTING THIEF. WE ARE DISSATISFIED WITH U.S. POLICY."

10. IN RESPONSE TO COMMENT BY HOGEN, YU CHAN SAID: "WE ARE ALSO AWARE THAT AFTER MR. CARTER BECAME PRESIDENT HE HAD NOT BEEN MAKING SO MANY REMARKS AS DURING THE CAMPAIGN. HOWEVER, WATCHING WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS DOING VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION, WE FEEL THERE IS SOME PROBLEM. WE DO NOT CRITICIZE OPENLY, BUT WHEN WE ARE TALKING FRANKLY IT IS DIFFERENT".

11. YU CHAN REITERATED THE STANDARD POINT THAT U.S. - JAPAN RELATIONS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN EITHER COUNTRY'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA. BUT, YU CHAN WENT ON HIS OWN ADVISE TO JAPAN WAS : "BE MORE INDEPENDENT OF THE U.S. DON'T LISTEN TO THE U.S. ONE HUNDRED PERCENT. WE SAY THE SAME THING TO WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. A COUNTRY SHOULD DEPEND PRIMARILY ON ITSELF. YOU SHOULD KEEP IT IN MIND THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DUNKIRK REPEATED (SIC) BY THE U.S. CANNOT BE RULED OUT".
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